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The international community has joined together in an effort to combat human trafficking.  
Utilizing the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, commonly known as the Palermo Protocols, the focus of combatant 
efforts has been tailored to fit three categories: prosecution, prevention, and protection.  Because 
the attention of several countries appears to be primarily devoted to prosecution, protection often 
falls victim to indifference, leaving victims without the care that they need to readjust to daily 
life.  While the three components are supposedly equal in weight, this inequality is apparent in 
several countries through their anti-trafficking efforts.  In this paper, I examine why some states 
offer greater levels of commitment to the protection component of the Palermo Protocols on 
human trafficking than others by examining a possible interactive effect between domestic and 
international factors.  While the interaction was not found to be statistically significant, 
international factors measured by a state’s level of international involvement as well as the 
domestic factor considering the presence of strict immigration policies provide a greater 
understanding of the topic as a whole and guidance for future research endeavors.   
1 
Introduction 
Today, one of the issues plaguing every country is human trafficking.  In 2018, the 
United States Polaris-operated hotline for human trafficking received reports of 10,949 cases 
(Polaris 2020).  Because human trafficking is an underreported crime, it is likely that this number 
is only a mere fraction of the actual cases in the United States.  This is just an example of one 
country; it is practically impossible to know how many cases actually exist in the world.  During 
human trafficking, victims are removed from their homes and are trafficked into forced labor, 
sex trafficking, or organ extraction.  
According to the International Labour Organization, commonly referred to as the ILO, 
there were an estimated 40.3 million individuals who were trafficked into a modern form of 
slavery.  Of these 40.3 million individuals, about 62% were trafficked into forced labor, and the 
remaining 38% were trafficked into forced marriages.  If the 62%, or 24.9 million people, who 
were trafficked into forced labor is broken down further, it is shown that 16 million were forced 
to work in the private sector, and 4.8 million were sexually exploited.  To dig a little deeper into 
the characteristics of the victims, 58% of victims of forced labor in the private sector and in labor 
imposed by state authorities are women, and 99% of victims who are sexually exploited are also 
women (International Labour Organization 2017).  To make matters worse, many perpetrators 
are known to the victim (Polaris 2020).  Countries, such as China, that have a disproportionate 
number of female victims who are frequently trafficked to forcibly serve as mothers or brides are 
commonly identified as destination countries (CIA, 2015).  Countries where the victims originate 
are referred to as source countries. 
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In the past few years, the international community has worked to alleviate this atrocity. 
To do so, they created the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons Especially Women and Children, a three-prong plan that includes efforts to prosecute 
traffickers, prevent trafficking, and protect victims (OHCHR 2000).  Prevention focuses on the 
efforts of a state to deter human trafficking through the use of training programs and the creation 
of laws against trafficking.  Prosecution seeks to measure the country’s attempt at locating and 
prosecuting traffickers.  The last of the three and the focus of this paper, protection, looks at how 
states work to prevent the criminalization of victims, offer resources to help victims heal, and 
provide assistance to assist victims in their quest to regain some normalcy.  Of the three, 
prosecution and prevention tend to be the primary focus of the majority of states (Cho, Dreher, 
and Neumayer 2014).  Protection is often the recipient of the least attention and resources. 
While some countries understand the importance of protection and comply with this section of 
the international efforts, others fail to do so.  Over time, this variation has failed to dissipate as 
many states continue to ignore the importance of protectionist policies.  ​Why is it that some 
countries offer greater levels of commitment to the protection component of the Palermo 
Protocols on human trafficking than others?  
If a better understanding of this topic can be achieved, a plan of action to improve 
compliance and the devotion of resources for protectionist policies can be formed by the 
international community, including cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and international organizations (IOs).  In order to improve this understanding, an answer must be 
discovered to the previous question.  Past literature on the matter focuses on the independent 
effects of various domestic factors or international factors on a state’s willingness to comply with 
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protectionist policies. While both factors are essential components for answering this question, 
studying them independently creates a gap in the explanation.  For instance, the study of 
domestic factors omits the influence of international pressures while focusing solely on 
international factors fails to account for the domestic cost analysis that impacts decisions.  For 
this reason, this paper seeks to answer the earlier question by looking at two overarching factors 
acting jointly as an interactive variable contributing to enhanced protection.  The first is domestic 
factors as determined by immigration policies, and the second is international factors illustrated 
by a country’s involvement in the international community.  
To test this theory, I use information from the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, World 
Population Policies created by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
and Cho’s 3-P Index ​(Cho 2015a; Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015; Gygli, 
Haelg, and Sturm 2018) ​.​  To analyze these data, I utilize an ordinary least squared (OLS) 
regression model to predict variations in protection scores.  
In analyzing the results from this model, I failed to find support for the theory that the 
level of international involvement and domestic factors as shown through immigration policies 
are conjunctively determinants of protection compliance.  The presence of strict international 
policies had no impact on the effect of international involvement in determining compliance. 
Furthermore, the presence of strict immigration policies was found to be insignificant.  While 
this is true, the significance of the variable pertaining to international involvement provides 
insight into the power of the international community to influence compliance decisions.  In 
terms of domestic factors, these findings did not rule out their involvement completely.  While 
immigration policies were not related to compliance, the analysis showed that a different factor, 
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the control over corruption, may provide a new path for evaluating compliance decisions in the 
future. 
I structure the remainder of the paper in the following way. First, I outline the relevant 
literature on human trafficking, particularly emphasizing scholarship on variations in types of 
human trafficking policies and in the proposed theoretical explanations for these variations. 
Then, I outline my theory as to the relationship between domestic immigration policies and the 
state’s political involvement in the international community, looking at an interactive effect 
between these two elements.  The following section will disclose the method of estimation 
utilized as well as a detailed description of the analyzed variables.  Next, the results of the model 
will be discussed followed by a discussion of the results in relation to the overall research 
question and theory.  Finally, I offer concluding thoughts on how this empirical analysis can help 
further the understanding of compliance with protection efforts related to human trafficking and 
how future research can expand on this understanding. 
Explaining Protection Compliance: Four Views 
Over the years, the issue of human trafficking has posed a growing threat to the world’s 
population, especially for Southeast Asia and Central Africa (United Nations 2019; U.S. 
Department of State 2018).  Having grown substantially in profitability, the industry reached a 
profit level of around $150 billion in 2014 (International Labour Organization 2014).  Since then, 
this number has likely grown as human trafficking does not appear to have slowed its pace. 
Governments around the globe have worked to find ways of combating this practice, and several 
scholars have worked diligently to create indices to measure the efforts of these states.  
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One index, utilized by the United States (U.S.) Department of State, is the tier system that 
classifies each state into one of three tiers based on their combatting efforts (U.S. Department of 
State 2019).  While this report makes it possible to see distinctly which states outperform the 
rest, this index fails to break down the score into the different components of compliance, which 
will be detailed later.  Instead of focusing on the specific areas where states excel and where 
states need to devote more attention, the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) reports offer only a 
generalized ranking based on the overall score.  This score makes it possible for two states to 
receive that same score while having different levels of commitment to various components of 
anti-trafficking efforts (Cho 2015c).  
To resolve this inconsistency, Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2014) constructed an index 
consisting of three components based on the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children created by the United Nations, 
commonly known as the Palermo Protocol.  This Protocol displayed an international attempt to 
resolve this global concern, and it disaggregates the components into three categories: 
prevention, prosecution, and protection (OHCHR 2000).  Following suit, the previously 
mentioned scholars modeled their index in the same three-component categorization.  Although 
it is noted that all three components are essential to a successful anti-trafficking effort, many 
states focus primarily on the prosecution component and largely ignore protection (Cho, Dreher, 
and Neumayer 2014).  Protection, in this sense, focuses on a state’s efforts to ensure that victims 
are not prosecuted as criminals and are not required to engage in self-identification as proof of 
being a victim, to provide legal assistance during legal proceedings, to provide residence permits 
and basic housing, to ensure that proper medical care is provided, and to provide all resources 
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needed to help the victim be able to get back to a sense of normalcy (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 
2014, 434)  
While state leaders are major contributors to this inequality, it cannot be said that outside 
influences from international actors did not assist them in moving in such a direction.  Advice on 
ways to combat trafficking from the international community and international anti-trafficking 
policies have largely prioritized the need to prosecute traffickers at all costs (Siddharth 2011); 
such suggestions omit the needs of victims.  Following the international emphasis on 
prosecution, some countries link the protection of victims with their willingness to aid in the 
investigations of law enforcement (Brunovskis 2013; Davy 2016; Pearson 2002).  For instance, 
human trafficking victims in Belgium and the Netherlands receive entirely different levels of 
protection depending on whether or not they aid an investigation, regardless of whether or not it 
is in their best interest to do so.  Refusing to offer assistance can result in deportation as an 
illegal immigrant; however, agreeing to help can result in ​an extended stay in the country, 
medical services, legal aid, counseling, financial help, and language courses (Pearson 2002, 57). 
Despite their similar practices, even these countries differ in their protection score as the 
Netherlands score two points lower than Belgium, showing the presence of significant variation 
of protection even among countries with great similarities (Cho 2015a).  While many countries 
similarly ignore the necessity of the protection component of the UN Protocol, other states work 
to comply, leaving the question of why certain states contribute greater resources to the 
protection component than others. 
When a state has failed to meet its international promises, other states often view this as a 
sign of deviance.  The appearance is that the violating state ratified the treaty without any 
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intention of complying.  With this in mind, states are less likely to trust them in future 
agreements, resulting in the deviant state’s removal from future negotiations.  The looming threat 
of such consequences can be an effective tool for pressuring ratifying states to comply with the 
protection component of the Protocol.  An example of such a threat working to encourage 
compliance can be seen in Japan.  In 2004, the annual TIP Report detailed the deportation of 
trafficking victims from the country by Japanese officials (U.S. Department of State 2004). 
Following the criticism from this report, the Japanese government responded by working to 
cease the criminalization of trafficking victims (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006). 
It appears as though Japan was fearful of the consequences of such a report and, as a result, made 
an effort to help salvage their reputation in the international community and to offer greater 
protection for individuals within the state.  Looking at the broader picture, overall compliance 
with human rights treaties has been increasing as the subject of the treaty becomes a greater 
international norm and noncompliance begins to cause greater damage to a country’s reputation 
(Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2010).  If compliance with the protection component follows 
the pattern of other human rights treaties, this case is just the beginning of change.  
The concept that a state’s level of commitment to protectionist policies is a result of the 
international community’s opinion showcases the impact that the expanding international 
community has on domestic policies.  As the community continues to become more 
interdependent, this concept may become more applicable, but it still leaves a gap in explaining 
why some states with a lower number of international ties succeed in complying.  While the 
above explanation details how large numbers of international ties can influence the actions of a 
state, it only applies to states that are active internationally.  The reach of the international 
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community, however, is restricted by the state’s ability to choose whether or not it will open 
itself up to the scrutiny of the community by becoming more involved internationally and 
gaining the accompanying responsibilities.  Isolationist states that are quite indifferent about the 
opinion of the community are not likely to be so concerned about their reputation, minimizing 
the cost of noncompliance (Lipson 1991).  This thought also seems to assume that states are 
willing to afford any cost in order to maintain a positive reputation.  While it is possible that 
some states may go to great lengths to preserve their reputation, others may find that the benefit 
does not outweigh the cost. 
The next approach to answering the question of compliance utilizes a rational-actor 
approach.  This model suggests that states make decisions to comply or not based on their ability 
to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs, both tangible and intangible.  Utilizing the 
expected cost to a state’s reputation as detailed earlier in this section, scholars have found that 
states tend to act in a manner that gains them praise from the major international powers (Cho 
and Vadlamannati 2012).  In order to achieve this goal, many states have focused on the 
components with the greatest benefit while foregoing commitment to the one with fewer 
benefits: namely, protection.  The focus of the international community is to reduce the flow of 
human trafficking.  As reduction is the main goal, it receives great attention from various 
countries because states may be able to improve their stance internationally if they can assist the 
community in this effort.  Directly related to this goal, prevention and prosecution offer a more 
streamlined approach to meeting this demand (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012).  Due to the greater 
benefit associated with these two components, protection is often excluded as it is a low-benefit 
and high-cost component.  
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To further diminish the importance of the protection component, the language in various 
policies, including the UN’s Protocol, appears to provide great detail in the areas of prevention 
and prosecution while offering only vague details for protection.  As numerous scholars looked 
into the efforts of Australia, Nigeria, and South Africa to combat human trafficking, they found 
that there was an issue in the UN’s Protocol that may have contributed to poorer compliance with 
protection: the language used in the Protocol lacked compulsivity and remains unclear in its 
expectations (Bello 2018; Davy 2016; Olateru ​-Olagbegi​ and Ikpeme 2006).  When deciding 
where protection needs to be applied, Olateru ​-Olagbegi​ and Ikpeme pointed out that the Protocol 
only indicated that it is to be applied in “appropriate cases” (2006, 12).  Another scholar 
suggested that even the UN was aware of this shortcoming as they later began to offer additional 
materials to help guide protectionist efforts (Davy 2016).  The suggestion that more attention 
was given to prevention and prosecution can lead to the assumption that these two areas are to be 
the main focus of the international community and possess the greatest benefits for states that 
comply with them.  With this indication, rational states would be expected to devote fewer 
resources to a component that has an associated cost that is greater than its benefits, resulting in a 
lower level of compliance. 
Through this approach, it can be seen that international pressure may not be the only 
determinant for compliance.  In addition to its impact, this concept demonstrates the effect of 
domestic components in the decision-making process.  It pushes the work beyond the 
international view and into a country-level approach.  Despite this progress, this approach 
maintains a large assumption about the various national governments.  It assumes that these 
governments are rational actors, but it is not feasible for the leaders to be perfectly rational in 
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their decisions.  Truly rational actors make decisions based on complete information of the 
current situation and all possible outcomes and utilize this information to reap the greatest 
benefit for the lowest cost.  As it is impossible for a person to know a hundred percent of the 
information, they do not meet the requirements of being a rational actor.  They cannot see the 
future to know for certain that their decision will result in the greatest benefit, and it is possible 
to make a commitment where the true consequence of noncompliance is unknown (Simmons 
2009). Whereas it may not be costly to ignore the protection component now, it may become so 
in the future as the norm of protecting victims grows, altering the cost-benefit analysis. 
Continuing to look at domestic factors, the presence of laws pertaining to the legal status 
of prostitution has been seen to impact human trafficking levels and, more noteworthy for the 
scope of this paper, to inhibit any improvement of, or even worsen, compliance levels for 
protection (Cho 2015b).  The foundation for this discussion is the economic aspect of human 
trafficking.  Scholars initially studied the impact of legalized prostitution on the inflow of human 
trafficking.  Utilizing the law of supply and demand, they concluded that countries with legalized 
prostitution were likely to increase demand and, as a result of this, increase supply. 
Alternatively, the heightened risk of continuing to participate in the market for prostitution where 
such acts were illegal drove both demand and supply down (Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 2013). 
As a result, the level of inflow of human trafficking decreased, reducing the size of the market. 
A comparative case that illustrates this point can be found in the differences between Sweden 
and Germany in 2004.  At this time, Germany had a population that was about ten times larger 
than that of Sweden, and the former country offered liberal prostitution policies while the latter 
maintained a stricter stance.  Despite the size of the difference in population, the ILO estimated 
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that the number of human trafficking victims in Germany was approximately sixty-two times 
greater than that of Sweden, demonstrating the possible consequence of liberal prostitution 
policies (Cho, Dreher, and Neumeyer 2013; Danailova-Trainor and Belser 2006).  Such 
economic logic and similar cases around the globe appeared to influence the stance of the U.S. 
government.  In their annual TIP Report, the U.S. Department of State commented on the 
nation’s view of prostitution by saying, “Prostitution is inherently harmful and dehumanizing 
and fuels trafficking in persons” (2007, 27).  
Within the legalization debate, there are two competing views.  One side views 
prostitution as a choice that people make to commercialize sex.  With this view, they believe that 
the legalization of prostitution would provide a safer work environment for these individuals as 
the increase in the supply of workers would reduce the likelihood of a person being forced to 
continue in the industry or perform nonconsensual acts (Cho 2015b).  The contrasting view sees 
prostitution as being a consequence of a patriarchial society; therefore, they believe that all 
women who are involved in prostitution are victims of this society (Cho 2015b).  When it comes 
to the argument of legalizing prostitution, it is clear to see that the latter view favors the abolition 
of the practice and supports illegalizing prostitution.  In reference to protection policies, Cho has 
found that the legalization of prostitution fails to have a positive impact on these policies and can 
make matters worse for victims in some societies, which may be the result of the logic of 
pro-legalization cultures (2015b).  The abolitionist view categorizes all prostitutes, even those 
who are there illegally, as victims.  As such, they require care and protection.  The other 
argument for legalization views them as simply workers who have no need for protection outside 
of protection from prosecution due to their chosen career.  Here, victims from other countries are 
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more likely to be treated as an illegal immigrant and must be prosecuted accordingly, resulting in 
low protection compliance.  
Not only does this research show that legalization of prostitution can increase the inflow 
of human trafficking due to the increased demand for prostitution, but it also shows that 
legalization can detract from progress for the protection of victims and even decrease the current 
protection levels.  This can aid policymakers in their decisions as it provides them with the 
insight that legalizing prostitution could negatively impact their efforts to combat human 
trafficking.  It also helps scholars to see the impact that domestic policies can have on a global 
issue.  The legalization of prostitution in one country can result in the trafficking of an individual 
in another country to meet the demand of the former.  Even though this can contribute to policy 
decisions, the explanation behind this argument appears to isolate the discussion to two, 
opposing beliefs.  This would assume that all countries are on one side or the other with nobody 
in between.  While this adds simplicity to the concept, it fails to explain the connection between 
the two variables when the mindset of the country’s leaders are not so distinctly on one side of 
the legalization debate. 
The final approach for this section focuses on the effect of immigration policies on victim 
protection.  On this topic, scholars have found that stricter immigration laws often result in the 
worsening of protection for human trafficking victims (Amahazion 2014; Amiel 2006).  Behind 
this conclusion, there are two different explanations for this occurrence.  One suggests that 
domestic concerns are the primary reason.  Referring back to the earlier discussion on costs, 
there is a greater cost to protection compliance.  Especially in regards to the state’s immigration 
policies, compliance would require resources to alter existing policies (Cho and Vadlamannati 
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2012).  While this may appear to be a minor expense, each action is likely to have its own set of 
consequences that will increase the primary cost.  In this case, the consequences could be an 
increase in immigration.  For states with low levels of immigration, this may not pose a great 
liability; however, states with high levels may find it difficult and costly to increase levels 
further, resulting in a lower willingness to weaken existing policies and a decreased amount of 
protection for the victims (Cho 2015b).  
The second explanation with regards to immigration acknowledges the goal of the 
international community to reduce human trafficking.  As states work to achieve the goal of 
reducing trafficking at home, they may choose to restrict immigration.  Per the conclusion of 
Danailova-Trainor and Belser, stricter immigration policies can reduce trafficking (2006).  It is 
believed that the stricter policies will allow for the removal of people from the country who are 
there illegally and may be participating in human trafficking.  The other hope is that the 
heightened risk of crossing borders illegally once strict policies are enacted will deter traffickers 
from attempting to enter their country.  This is a great contrast from what states fear may happen 
with lenient immigration policies.  If states allow more immigration into their country, they may 
attract more people seeking a different country to reside in.  This is not to suggest that the state is 
reluctant to help such individuals; they are more concerned about the safety of these individuals 
during their journey to the country.  As they travel to their location, they become vulnerable to 
traffickers who may harm them along the way.  In the end, the concern is that relaxed 
immigration policies will increase the number of human trafficking victims as it attracts a large 
group of people who will be more vulnerable to such horrors (Cho and Vadlamanatti 2012).  As 
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a means to prevent such atrocities, states believe that their best choice is to strengthen their 
immigration laws. 
While these strengthened policies may achieve the state’s goal of reducing human 
trafficking, they may also worsen conditions for the victims who will likely receive less 
protection from the government.  Often, the victims have nowhere to turn to for assistance; 
furthermore, many victims are aware that their families and communities are likely to ostracize 
them as they are now viewed as being impure.  One victim from Myanmar who was trafficked 
around the age of forty-six was interviewed by Human Rights Watch, and she spoke about her 
concerns surrounding her return home to Kachin State.  She stated that the Kachin society “looks 
down” on people who have sexual relations, consensual or forced, outside of marriage.  As a 
victim, she was terrified of how her own society would treat her upon her return, and she was not 
the only one with such concerns (Human Rights Watch 2019).  Due to this fear and the fact that 
many cannot afford to go anywhere else, it would be in their best interest to remain in the 
country without fear of deportation.  Because of the stricter immigration policies that are being 
enacted, however, it is not likely that their interests will be protected.  Because these trafficking 
victims are not often legal citizens of the country where they are trafficked, it is probable that 
they will also fall victim to the purge on illegal immigrants.  Because of their status as illegal 
immigrants, they will likely be prosecuted as a criminal and be deported from the country, 
offering them no form of protection.  As can be seen, the objective of prosecution through 
tougher immigration laws can reduce the protection of victims and treat them equally to their 
traffickers. 
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A major part of this approach is that it does not simply assume that all states fail to 
comply due to their domestic needs.  It stretches past the self-interest approach to explain why 
those states that are actively seeking a solution to this problem regardless of the cost may choose 
to forgo compliance with the protection component of the Protocol.  This provides insight on two 
different thoughts and how each one factors into the overall discussion on protection.  One 
assumption that this approach does make, however, is that states are incapable of separating 
victims from other criminals.  The assumption is that states will participate in mass deportation 
without first attempting to identify the victims.  While this may be the case in some situations, 
this idea may be flawed for others where a genuine effort to protect victims from deportation is 
present.  It also fails to demonstrate the impact of the entire international community on states’ 
decisions.  The refusal to reduce immigration policies and offer greater protection because of the 
risk of increasing human trafficking demonstrates the belief of some that prevention should be 
maintained even at the expense of protection, but other groups may offer contrasting views that 
the two objectives are equal and should be treated as such.  This approach only looks at a portion 
of the international community while excluding the impact of the remaining groups. 
While each approach has benefited the study of why some states commit to the protection 
component of the UN Protocol while others neglect it, two approaches appear to have the 
greatest impact: the number of international ties and the strictness of immigration policies.  The 
first allows scholars to utilize knowledge on a factor that is likely to grow over time as the 
international community continues to become more connected, and the second helps show the 
considerations of both self-focused and international goal-oriented states. While these are both 
beneficial to the overall question, they still fall short on their own.  The discussion on a state’s 
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involvement internationally fails to acknowledge domestic factors that contribute to the 
compliance levels as well.  The later discussion that demonstrates the impact of immigration 
laws on compliance neglects to account for the impact of the growing international norm of 
protection on states’ compliance levels.  Instead, it assumes that states will remain focused on the 
primary goal of decreasing human trafficking as suggested by the Protocol.  Despite their 
individual shortcomings, I believe that both discussions can work together to create a new 
approach centered on the idea that it is a combination of international and domestic factors that 
impact a state’s decision to comply.  
Despite the reality that the international community is growing, a few states remain 
focused solely on their own self interest without regards for their international reputation. 
Because of this, the focus cannot be shifted solely onto the actions of the international 
community, but this is not to mean that its importance is not to be acknowledged.  A new 
approach combining both domestic and international factors could add the domestic focus 
needed to improve the discussion of international involvement and show the impact of the entire 
international community on the protection policies of various countries.  This would allow for a 
study to be performed on the actions of states that have numerous ties and strict immigration 
policies, providing a foundation that further efforts to improve protection compliance can work 
from.  
Theory 
As made evident by the wording of the UN Protocol, the original international push was 
to focus on decreasing the rate of human trafficking with the understanding that some attempt 
should be made to protect the victims.  Victim protection, however, was not at the forefront of 
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this effort as much as prevention and prosecution were.  The push from various groups for 
greater victim protection has led to the growth of a protectionist norm in the international 
community.  It has grown to the point that the UN is now introducing informational resources on 
protection measures to help redirect the focus of states and to move protection to an equal 
position with its two counterparts, but some countries did not follow this direction, creating the 
question as to why some did and others did not (Brunovskis 2013, Davy 2016).  Two main 
components will be evaluated in this study in association with this decision to comply or not: 
international influence and domestic cost factors. 
This emergent norm has allowed the international community to have the ability to 
generate greater compliance from states.  Following the pattern from other international treaties, 
especially human rights treaties, states begin to develop a reputation for themselves as they 
become more connected within the international community (Lipson 1991). Depending on the 
state’s actions, this reputation can have great benefits or substantial consequences for states 
seeking to continue and grow their international involvement. For this reason, scholars have 
found that states with strong international ties are more likely to ensure the protection of victims 
by making sure that they are not criminalized and that they have the needed assistance 
(Amahazion 2014; Avdeyeva 2012; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). When states ratify treaties, 
they are willingly tying their reputation to their promise to comply with the treaty’s requirements 
(Lipson 1991).  If they comply, their reputation remains intact. Failure to comply, however, can 
leave a lasting impression of being a deviant actor that will result in lasting consequences 
(Avdeyeva 2007).  Such consequences are the exclusion from future negotiations and difficulty 
in future negotiations due to a history of noncompliance (Lipson 1991). 
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In addition to international costs, governments must also take domestic costs into 
consideration.  Implementing new policies can require the use of various resources such as time 
and money.  Once these policies are in place, there is often little desire to use further resources to 
alter them.  For states that have implemented strict anti-immigration policies, whether it be for 
domestic reasons or as a means to decrease human trafficking, it can be costly to retract and issue 
new policies to replace the old (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012).  They would be required to take 
time away from other issues, to create training programs to educate people on how to comply 
with the new policy, and to cover a variety of other costs.  With these expenses, it would be 
irrational to make a decision to alter their policies for the benefit of protection, especially when 
there is a concern that it could jeopardize the success of prosecutorial efforts.  As a result, states 
with strict immigration policies are not likely to receive a high rating for protection. 
While each perspective discussed in the previous section has a role to play in its own 
right, they each leave some unanswered questions.  The presence of international ties does not 
explain the impact of domestic costs, and the expense of altering immigration policies does not 
explain the effects of the international community on such decisions.  They do, however, appear 
as though they could act as complements to each other.  For instance, the presence or absence of 
strict immigration policies may affect how impactful international efforts are for encouraging 
greater protection, creating an interactive effect.  The remaining piece of the puzzle is how 
countries act when their characteristics create contrasting costs.  In this paper, the effects of 
complementary international and domestic costs, both for and against protection compliance, and 
the effects of contradictory costs will be covered in regards to their effect on the levels of 
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commitment.  Associated with these factors, there are four main combinations and three primary 
outcomes as is shown in table 1.  
Table 1: Theorized outcomes related to interactive variables 

















For states with strong international ties and lenient immigration policies, it would be 
expected that they would have greater levels of commitment to protectionist policies.  This 
commitment would originate from the analysis of the two levels of cost mentioned earlier. 
Domestically, policies are less restrictive, decreasing the rate of deportation and criminalization 
of victims.  With this type of policy in place, there is not an additional cost needed to transform 
the legislation into something that would better ensure victim protection.  On an international 
level, there is a cost present, but this penalizes states for noncompliance rather than adding an 
expense to comply.  If countries fail to comply with protectionist policies, the consequences 
detailed previously would ensue.  
On the other hand, benefits can result from upholding these policies.  Protecting victims 
can demonstrate to the international community the state’s willingness to cooperate with others 
and commit to various efforts.  Such attention can boost a country’s reputation and help them be 
more involved in negotiations and new treaties.  In the end, states with several ties and lenient 
policies only have a cost if they fail to comply.  If they decide to implement protectionist 
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policies, they are likely to find a reputational benefit attached to such actions, resulting in a 
rational decision that would likely result in a greater commitment to victim protection. 
As a complete opposite of the situation detailed before, states with few or no international 
ties and strict immigration policies are likely to have lower protection compliance.  Contrary to 
the earlier outcome of low domestic cost, countries in this situation would find that there is a 
domestic cost to alter their current policies toward immigration.  Because strong immigration 
policies typically result in greater amounts of deportation, including the deportation of victims, 
they are not conducive to greater protection (Amahazion 2014).  This means that compliance 
would require a transformation of these policies that would result in more lenient policies or the 
improvement of practices for separating victims from illegal immigrants.  This cost may deter 
countries from making such changes and from improving the protection of victims.  
On an international level, there is no longer a cost of noncompliance that would offset the 
cost of domestic compliance nor is there any true benefit for compliance.  If a state is not 
internationally active, it is unlikely that they care significantly about their international 
reputation (Lipson 1991).  As reputational threats are what is frequently used to pressure states to 
comply, international pressure will be ineffective for states that are unbothered by such 
consequences.  In this case, there are no consequences on an international or domestic scale for 
noncompliance. There is not a benefit for compliance, and the only cost would be to improve 
compliance domestically.  As a result, states that are not well intertwined with the international 
community and that have strict immigration laws are more likely to choose to forgo compliance 
with protectionist policies as the result of their cost-benefit analysis. 
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With combined characteristics, some countries may find themselves in an area that does 
not fit into one of the two classifications above.  It may be the case that a state has a mixture of 
the two factors and has numerous international ties while also having strict immigration policies, 
producing a medial level of compliance.  Based on the previous discussion, there are 
international costs for noncompliance and domestic costs for compliance.  The question remains 
as to whether international pressure will triumph with high compliance or domestic factors will 
lead to low protection for victims.  A third option could lie somewhere in between.  
For instance, countries may find that they have few to no international ties and lenient 
immigration policies.  This scenario positions the country between the two extremes. 
Consequently, it would be anticipated that these states would see a middle level of compliance. 
Unlike internationally involved states, these states do not have a cost associated with 
noncompliance.  With relaxed immigration policies, it is likely that they are criminalizing fewer 
victims than those with stringent policies, creating a greater level of compliance.  What restricts 
this compliance from growing even more, however, is the lack of an international cost of 
noncompliance and the lack of an international benefit for complying.  This leaves the state with 
no true incentive to provide greater protection for victims beyond what already exists in their 
domestic policies.  
What could possibly drive this level to more of a middle point rather than a lower 
position is the prospect of becoming more involved in the international community.  While a 
state may currently have few international ties, they may intend on becoming more 
internationally active in the future.  As an effort to show the sincerity of their commitment, they 
could choose to demonstrate greater compliance with the protection component of the Protocol, 
22 
increasing compliance.  While this may appear as though it should generate high levels of 
commitment, the fact that there is no immediate benefit will likely lead to the restriction of 
compliance, causing these states to display a medium level of compliance.  
Finally, when a country immerses itself in the international community, it is not likely 
that they will turn away from their obligations.  The reputational cost for noncompliance along 
with the benefits previously discussed would coerce a rational actor to act in a manner that 
protects victims in order to minimize costs and maximize benefits.  On the domestic front, 
choosing to alter policies will be very costly, and deciding to make such changes could upset 
government officials and other citizens, possibly jeopardizing the stability of the country.  In 
response to this cost, governments will likely decide to leave policies as they are, but this does 
not mean that efforts cannot be made to improve compliance with the protection component of 
the Protocol.  Another avenue for compliance, such as providing training to law enforcement 
officers on how to tell the signs of a human trafficking victim, could be utilized by states to 
minimize this cost without failing to comply entirely.  While this may not result in the same level 
of compliance as states with strong ties and lenient policies, it is probable that it will result in 
greater compliance than states with few ties and strict policies, placing them somewhere in 
between.  In summary, it is expected that countries with numerous international ties and strict 
immigration policies will see improvement in commitment levels as a result of international 
pressure, but such improvement will be limited by the domestic costs. 
Hypothesis: States that have high levels of engagement in the international community will offer 
greater protection to human trafficking victims and contribute greater resources to this endeavor, 
but this effect will be lower for states with strict immigration policies that will limit the influence of 
the international involvement on protection compliance. 
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Research Design 
Previously, I theorized that a combination of international pressure and domestic costs 
alters the level of protection offered to human trafficking victims.  Put plainly, the level of 
compliance with protectionist human trafficking policies is dependent upon a country’s level of 
involvement in the international community and the cost of altering current domestic policies to 
better promote victim protection.  The three main variables of focus are a state’s degree of 
international involvement, their domestic legal policies, and their level of protection provided for 
victims of human trafficking.  
For this study, the dependent variable will be the 2014 protection score for 179 countries 
provided by Cho’s 3-P Index (2015a).  This index evaluates each country’s prosecutorial, 
preventive, and protectionist efforts, with an overall index score being the aggregate of all three 
components.  For each factor, the scores range from one to five with one being the least 
compliant, and five indicating the greatest amount of compliance.  Due to the nature of my 
theoretical argument, only protection efforts will be covered in the analysis.  In order to measure 
the protection efforts, nine key elements of a legitimate protection effort are examined: “no 
punishment of victims; imposing no self-identification in order to prove their status as a victim; 
assistance for legal proceedings; the provision of residence permits; basic services for housing; 
medical care; job training; assistance for rehabilitation; assistance for repatriation” (Cho, Dreher, 
and Neumayer 2014, 434).  A score of one indicates that a country is making “no effort” to offer 
protection, and a score of five indicates that a state is making a “very strong effort” to protect 
victims (ibid). 
24 
As mentioned in an earlier section, Cho’s index offers a more detailed look at the efforts 
of a country to protect victims than the United States Department of State’s tier system.  The tier 
system only offers an overall glance at countries’ anti-human trafficking efforts instead of a 
disaggregated measurement that would allow for a closer examination of the various components 
that make up such efforts.  In order to focus on a specific factor, readers must utilize a qualitative 
analysis of the country within the reports.  Unlike this measurement, Cho’s index offers a 
quantitative measurement of three different components, allowing for a more in-depth evaluation 
of each country’s efforts to protect victims. The 3-P Index utilized the US Department of State’s 
Annual Trafficking in Persons report and Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to evaluate each state’s performance (Cho, 
Dreher, and Neumayer 2014).  While utilizing data from the US Department of State may 
incorporate a slight bias into the index, this bias is controlled by the inclusion of the UNODC’s 
reports that incorporates an international perspective.  This creates a source of information that is 
free from the domestic biases found within a U.S. agency. 
For my independent variable measuring a country’s level of international involvement, I 
use the 2013 KOF political globalization score, which is one of three component parts of the 
KOF measure of globalization.  This measure will allow for the evaluation of each country’s 
international involvement.  This score considers the number of embassies in a state, the amount 
of personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping missions, the number of international NGOs the 
state is associated with, the number of IOs the state is a part of, and the number of partners a 
state has in investment treaties (Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm 2018).  Based on these six components, 
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each country is scored on a scale from one to one hundred.  A score of one is indicative of no 
international involvement, and a score of 100 indicates the greatest amount of involvement.  
Because international involvement can take different forms, it is necessary to utilize a 
measurement that does not focus solely on one type of involvement.  For example, a state may 
not be part of many NGOs, but they may still be a member of several IOs.  If the involvement 
with NGOs was the only thing that was measured, it is likely that this example country would 
have been overlooked in the study.  Due to such a possibility, the KOF score was selected to 
ensure that all forms of international activity were accounted for. This data also provides 
coverage of the greatest number of countries, creating a fairly decent sample of 189 countries to 
study.  This helps to prevent bias toward one specific type of country and allows for more fitting 
inferences to be made about the greater population. 
To operationalize the independent variable evaluating a country’s domestic legal policies, 
I look at the stringency of its immigration policies.  As discussed previously, a state with strict 
immigration policies is likely to criminalize a greater number of victims than a country with 
lenient policies (Amahazion 2014).  Because of this, such states would need to alter their 
immigration policies to be more lenient in order to offer greater protection to victims.  Such costs 
associated with these alterations are likely to deter the country from making an effort to comply 
with protectionist policies.  To measure this variable, I use the 2013 World Population Policies 
Database created by the population division of the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (UNDESA).  These data cover 196 countries with available data (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 2015).  Other data sources were considered, but many excluded 
countries that were not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD).  Because OECD members tend to be more economically developed than 
non-members, utilizing data that only consists of OECD countries would bias the results as the 
varying characteristics of the entire population would not be accurately represented.  Because of 
this, the data from UNDESA was selected. 
This report classifies policies into three categories based on their intended effects on 
immigration: “lower”, “maintain”, or “raise”.  There are two other groups that are often 
collapsed into one category: “no intervention” and “no policy” (Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs 2015).  To quantify this data, the variable was dichotomized to indicate whether or 
not the country employed strict immigration policies.  States aiming to maintain or raise 
immigration were coded as a zero as well as states that did not interfere with immigration or had 
no existing policies.  As these states were not attempting to impose restrictions to immigration, 
they are classified as not having strict policies.  Contrary to these countries, the remaining states 
that were intending to lower immigration were coded as a one, indicating restrictive policies. 
In addition to examining the relationship of these variables to my dependent variable 
independently, I also consider the possibility of an interactive effect.  As my theory states, a 
state’s level of compliance is not solely reliant upon one of these variables.  Instead, it is the two 
variables in conjunction to each other that cause an impact.  The effect of one is dependent on 
the presence of the other.  To measure this, the two independent variables detailed above will be 
interacted.  The interaction variable is the product of the dichotomous immigration variable and 
the continuous KOF political globalization score.  By doing this, it can be seen whether the 
presence of one influences the effect of the other.  In the scope of this paper, the interaction will 
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show whether or not the presence of strict immigration policies will impact the effect of 
international involvement on a state’s protection score. 
Following the independent variables, I also include three control variables: polity score, 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and corruption.  Identified by the investigations of 
other scholars, these controls were selected to control for the various factors that have been 
found to impact a country’s decision to offer protection to victims or not.  By controlling for 
these various factors, an isolated assessment of the independent variables’ effect on protection 
can be conducted.  
The use of the 2013 polity score from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research (2019) allows for the control of the effect that a state’s level of democratization can 
have on protectionist policies.  More democratic countries are likely to offer greater protection to 
victims as a failure to do so would risk the realization of political consequences in the next 
election.  This research will also utilize the measurement of GDP per capita for the year 2013 
that is provided by the World Bank (2020).  The economic position of a country can alter a 
state’s capacity to offer protection.  As this is not what this paper is intending to assess, it is 
important that such an impact is controlled for.  To allow for a more normal distribution of the 
data, this variable was reformatted to be the natural log of GDP per capita.  Finally, this study 
will control for a state’s control of corruption.  A country with a strong presence of corruption 
will not likely aim to ensure the protection of human trafficking victims as the primary focus is 
likely to be centered around the needs and wants of the individuals in charge of the country.  Due 
to this, it is probable that corruption will have a negative effect on protection.  To control for this 
effect, I included a control variable assessing the level of control that a state has on corruption as 
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measured by the World Governance Indicators (WGI) project in 2013 under the World Bank 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2018). 
To evaluate the effect of the interaction between the stringency of immigration policies 
and the KOF political globalization score on a state’s protection score, a quasi-experiment at a 
country level using the data available from the years 2013 and 2014 was conducted.  The 
dependent variable is lagged in order to account for the effect of the policies and events from 
2013 on compliance decisions.  While this dependent variable is only formed using a five-unit 
scale, it was treated as a continuous variable as there is a theoretically accepted, unified 
difference between each score on the scale.  Because the theory suggests that a combination of 
contrasting costs will result in a middle-ground effect on protection, it would not be beneficial to 
dichotomize the dependent variable and run a logistic regression.  If this variable was 
dichotomized, it would only indicate whether or not a country offered protection for victims.  It 
would not show any midpoint; therefore, the dichotomization of the dependent variable would 
eliminate a core part of this theory.  With this established, the data was evaluated using a linear 
regression model consisting of the continuous dependent variable, the two independent variables 
along with the interaction, and the three control variables. 
Data Analysis 
As mentioned previously, a linear regression model was utilized to analyze any existing 
relationships between the data.  When running a regression model with all three independent 
variables and the control, I fail to find support for my central hypothesis.  The results of this 
analysis are found in Model 1 of Table 2.  Looking at Model 1 with the interaction, the first 
independent variable of the KOF political globalization score was found to be significant at the 
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99% confidence level. With a beta coefficient of 0.012, this indicates that, on average, a 0.012 
increase in protection score will occur for every one unit change in the KOF score.  Overall, this 
means that a state’s compliance with protective human trafficking policies will increase as they 
develop more international ties and become more active in the international community.  Failing 
to have a p-value less than 0.05, the dichotomous immigration policy variable was not 
statistically significant.  Following this, the interaction between the two variables also failed to 
reach significance.  According to these findings, there is not an interactive effect that occurs 
between the KOF score and the presence of strict immigration policies.  Furthermore, 
immigration policies on their own also have no effect on the protection score of countries.  While 
these findings may not speak to the reasonings behind compliance, the significant KOF score 
does provide insight into this topic on its own and warrants further attention, as will be discussed 
later. 
Of the three control variables, only corruption was statistically significant.  The p-value 
of the logged GDP control was 0.889.  With a p-value so close to 1.00, it appears the GDP is not 
systematically related to the protection score. Polity, despite having a much lower p-value, was 
similarly insignificant. Unlike these two controls, the WGI corruption score variable was  
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and had a beta coefficient of 0.242.  This 
denotes a 0.242 unit increase in protection score, on average, for every one unit change in the 
corruption score.  This means that as a state gains greater control over corruption, its protection 
score will improve.  Finally, when all variables are at a value of zero, the average protection 





After running a regression model with the interaction, another model was run without the 
interaction variable.  This model would allow for an analysis of the KOF score and the strictness 
of the immigration policies to be conducted without any interference from the interaction.  No 
variable saw a change in the level of significance compared to what was previously detailed, but 
a few had different beta coefficients as shown in Model 2 of Table 2. The beta coefficient for the 
KOF score is now 0.013, indicating that a one unit increase in the score will result in a 0.013 unit 
increase in a state’s protection score on average.  The beta coefficient for the WGI corruption 
score also changed.  Without the interaction, there will be a 0.244 unit change on average in the 
protection score for every one unit change in the WGI score.  Because the interaction was found 
to be insignificant in the first model, the true value for the WGI score is better depicted in this 
second model and will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.  For this model, 
the average protection score will be 1.792 when all other variables have a value of zero.  This 
model explains 24.2% of variation of the protection score. 
Discussion 
In this piece, I theorized that an interactive effect between international and domestic 
conditions affected a country's willingness to comply with protectionist human trafficking 
policies. However, based on my empirical analysis, I fail to find support for this hypothesis. 
This indicates that the number of international ties intertwined with the stringency of 
immigration policies does not systematically impact the level of protection that a state offers to 
victims.  Furthermore, and based on the results from the model without the inclusions of the 
interaction, the fact that a state has strict immigration policies, or does not have strict policies, 
bears no effect on a country’s protectionist policies.  With the control of corruption and the KOF 
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political globalization score showing as significant, however, it is not entirely out of the question 
that domestic and international factors may impact compliance. 
The idea that immigration is an indicator of a country's willingness or capability to 
change is rooted in the ideas of mentality and cost.  Countries with strict immigration policies are 
thought to be focused on the idea that protectionist policies are subordinate to prosecutorial and 
preventive policies.  These states follow the mentality that the issue of human trafficking is better 
resolved by increasing efforts aimed at furthering prosecution, including criminalizing all who 
are in the country illegally regardless of their victim status.  With this thought process, these 
leaders are not as likely to ensure that protection is offered to victims as leaders who see 
protection as being equivalent in importance to its two counterparts.  The concept of cost is 
demonstrated in the resources required, both tangible and intangible, to alter the domestic 
policies and practice to be more compliant with protectionist policies.  States with strict policies, 
as discussed earlier in the paper, have a greater cost to comply as they have more alterations to 
complete in order to boost compliance, decreasing the likelihood that these states will offer 
protection.  When the interaction failed to be significant, the test was conducted again with all 
variables except the interaction.  The data can be seen in Model 2 of Table 2. 
With this new data, immigration remained insignificant while political globalization and 
control of corruption remained significant.  This finding led to the thought that perhaps domestic 
factors should not be looked at in terms of mentality but instead should be looked at in terms of 
capacity.  Cost remains a factor as there is a cost to alter anything or to provide anything.  More 
importantly, however, is the ability to afford that cost.  While immigration looked at the 
willingness to assume such expenses, control of corruption looks at the ability.  If a state cannot 
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manage to control the corruption within its borders, it is improbable that it has the capacity to 
extend resources to other areas such as victim protection.  Furthermore, corruption is likely to 
lead to a more favorable situation for the leaders than for the average citizen.  More resources 
will probably be spent ensuring the welfare, protection, and luxury of those in charge, leaving 
little to provide for the remaining people.  This variable shows that domestic factors are still 
involved in compliance, but the data from this variable were not tested in conjunction with 
international factors and can therefore not be used to support the overall theory.  Perhaps this 
idea can be tested in future research. 
While domestic factors remain in a state of uncertainty, international factors, as measured 
by the KOF political globalization score, showed to be significant in both models.  Beyond 
significance, the international involvement has a positive relationship with that country’s 
protection efforts.  As a country becomes more involved in the international community and 
opens itself up to the pressures of compliance that come along with it, they are more likely to 
comply with protectionist policies, which are now starting to receive greater international 
attention.  On the other side of the spectrum, states with few international ties are less likely to 
adhere to such policies as they have not allowed themselves to be vulnerable to such scrutiny. 
Connecting this back to the control of corruption, states that are involved in the international 
community and who fail to adequately control corruption within their borders may attract greater 
attention and face heightened international scrutiny as a result, pressuring them further to make 
particular changes and offer greater compliance.  As one factor has the potential to impact the 
effects of the other, the two together continue to indicate the possibility of domestic and 
international factors having an interactive effect on compliance. 
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In summary, the overall theory is not supported by the data.  Immigration failed to be a 
significant variable and therefore has no systematic relationship with protection scores.  While 
the insignificance of the interaction in this research was similarly insignificant, future research 
that focuses on domestic factors as a product of capacity rather than mentality may find different 
results.  Furthermore, the international community has changed greatly since the years that were 
included in my empirical analysis.  Newer data could also bear a different outcome, and 
analyzing a larger period of time could help adjust for the spuriousness that may be present in the 
data at any moment.  In the end, the two significant variables demonstrate the importance of both 
domestic factors and international factors as separate entities, but it cannot be concluded based 
on this study that protection is a result of the two in relation to one another.  The value of one 
cannot be said to impact the effect of the other. 
Conclusion 
In this piece, I address a current gap in the human trafficking literature.  Specifically, I 
address the variation in protectionist human trafficking policies.  Previous research has 
predominantly centered around the idea that it is either domestic factors or international factors 
that independently impact the provision of protection to victims.  Rather than following this and 
focusing on one factor individually, my theory instead emphasizes the interactive effect of both 
levels.  With the level of connections in the international community continuing to grow today, it 
is necessary to include international pressure as a leading factor, but the theory would be 
incomplete without addressing the domestic costs that drive the decisions of the government. 
Although I fail to find support for my empirical analysis, further studies should explore the 
reasoning for variation in protectionist policies.  
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For human trafficking victims, protection is an element in the task of regaining a sense of 
normalcy.  Without being afforded the necessary protections, these victims risk being prosecuted 
as an illegal immigrant by the country where they were trafficked.  Protection policies help law 
enforcement officers ensure that victims do not suffer further by being criminalized for 
something that they had no choice in.  Furthermore, such policies assist victims by offering 
medical attention to help them recover physically, support to help them recover mentally, shelter 
to offer protection, and job training to help return to an everyday lifestyle.  While all of these 
factors are essential to the recovery of victims, many states focus solely on prosecution without 
granting much consideration to protection.  Prosecution does help to punish traffickers and deter 
trafficking in the future, helping individuals stay safe from becoming a victim of trafficking, but 
it does nothing for those who have already suffered from the reality of human trafficking.  If 
states decide to forgo their responsibility to protect victims, they condemn the victims to suffer 
further in their quest to simply regain a sense of normalcy. 
To help improve protectionist policies around the world, leaders must first understand 
what factors are involved in the decision to comply or not.  If these factors are uncovered, they 
can be utilized to encourage compliance from country leaders.  For instance, the impact of 
international pressure was discussed in several pieces of literature, as mentioned earlier, that 
referenced its power to impose reputational costs.  Members of the international community can 
apply such pressure to states that fail to meet the international standard of protection, threatening 
their reputation.  While the international community does not have a true means of enforcement, 
these pressures can prove to be quite effective.  Encouraging greater compliance can help victims 
receive the assistance that they so desperately need. 
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Ultimately, these pressures can help reduce the gap between rights in principle and rights 
in practice.  States are very quick to try to acquire a strong position within the international 
community.  One way to improve their position is to reap the benefits that result from showing 
the initiative to ratify treaties concerning major, global issues such as human trafficking.  While 
the community perceives such ratification as a promise to aid in the battle to end trafficking, the 
truth is that this ratification is nothing more than a trivial gesture intended to obtain a greater 
position for themselves.  To help identify states that are likely posing as a supporter while 
offering no resources, the international factors as well as domestic factors that encourage 
compliance must be discovered.  It is the combination of the two that will offer an avenue for the 
identification of those who are likely to join in on the fight to resolve this salient issue and 
further inspire them to provide greater protection. 
In the future, it could be intriguing to utilize a time-series empirical analysis.  This study 
concludes that international factors are important in determining compliance, but the 
international community has not always had such a strong influence over the actions of 
countries.  Before the rise of this influence, the question could be asked again as to what 
influenced compliance.  Considering the fact that international factors have been removed in this 
instance, this would have to be a domestic factor.  While immigration has been found to be 
insignificant, the discussion surrounding corruption from a previous section could be a start for 
this new investigation.  By finding the factor that mattered before the international community 
grew in power, insight could be provided into what else may impact the decisions of countries 
today. This factor in conjunction with international pressures can create a full picture of what 
drives protection compliance.  This would continue to follow the theory that domestic policies 
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and structures can influence the effect that international factors have on compliance.  What 
remains to be discovered is the domestic factor that influences the decisions of government 
leaders.  If these factors are discovered, a safer environment, characterized by greater protection, 
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